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From Analysis to Synthesis: Conceiving a 
Transformative Metaphysics for the Twenty-first 
Century
Mikhail Epstein
1 Part i: How to Move from Analysis to Synthesis1
1.1 Is Analysis a Goal in Itself?
It is well known that in philosophy, especially of the English-speaking world, 
the analytical approach has been predominant for about a century. Critical 
analysis is directed mostly at the logical structure of language as well as at con-
cepts, definitions and propositions. Bertrand Russell, one of the founders of 
analytic philosophy, states: “One purpose that has run through all that I have 
said, has been the justification of analysis, i.e., the justification of logical atom-
ism, of the view that you can get down in theory, if not in practice, to ultimate 
simples, out of which the world is built.”2 Robert Ammerman clarifies this as-
sessment: “To analyze, we may say roughly, is to take apart in order to gain a 
better understanding of what is being analyzed… The philosopher … is inter-
ested in analyzing linguistic or conceptual units. He is concerned, in general, 
with coming to understand the structure of language by a careful study of its 
elements and their interrelations. We will use the word ‘analysis’ (or ‘analytic 
philosophy’), then, to refer to any philosophy which places its greatest empha-
sis upon the study of language and its complexities.”3
What would be, then, the place of the synthetic approach in contemporary 
philosophy? In fact, it is practically never discussed or even mentioned, though 
analysis and synthesis are known to be correlative procedures. The one-sided 
development of analysis at the expense of synthesis is a huge loss for philosophy, 
which has therefore been divested of much of its creative, constructive 
potential.
1 I am grateful to John Michael Corrigan, an Associate Professor of American Literature and 
Digital Humanities at National Chengchi University, Taipei City, Taiwan, for his help in edit-
ing this article.
2 The Philosophy of Logical Atomism. Cited in Robert Ammerman, ed., Classics of Analytic Phi-
losophy. (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1965), 26.
3 Robert Ammerman. A Short History of Analytic Philosophy, in Robert Ammerman, ed., Clas-
sics of Analytic Philosophy. (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1965), 2.
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Bertrand Russell suggested that philosophical analysis should conclude 
with a synthesis: “The business of philosophy, as I conceive it, is essentially that 
of logical analysis, followed by logical synthesis.”4 But analytic philosophy, as a 
rule, does not reach the point of synthesis, stopping at the stage of disintegra-
tion of the whole and ignoring the task of its re-creation from the parts. The 
analysis divides judgments into subjects and predicates, syllogisms into prem-
ises and conclusions, sentences into words and then morpheme—and the 
thinker then examines the primary units, the logical atoms of these construc-
tions. This is an important, but preliminary stage of philosophical work, which 
then must proceed to the synthesis of new concepts and judgments that are 
different from those initially given and are formed only by the constructive 
recombination of their elements.
Alexander of Aphrodisias, the authoritative commentator on Aristotle’s 
Analytics, indirectly foresaw the possibility of Synthetics when he wrote: “For 
analysis is the converse of synthesis. Synthesis is the road from the principles 
to those things that derive from the principles, and analysis is the return from 
the end to the principles…”5 In other words, synthesis is a progressive vector in 
the being of things, towards their goal, while analysis is a regress to the primary 
elements of which things are composed.
Sometimes a synthesis is understood only as an inverse procedure in rela-
tion to analysis: by dividing a concept or a judgment into elements, we then 
derive the same original concept out of them to demonstrate the correctness 
of the analysis, to prove that the concept is composed of the same elements to 
which it was divided. But this is a very limited, reductionist understanding of 
synthesis as just a test or proof of analysis. Such a synthesis does not produce 
anything new, but only returns to the known, to that original given, from which 
the analysis departed.
Meanwhile, the task of philosophical synthesis, as I understand it, is the cre-
ation of new concepts, terms, ideas, judgments, principles, and also more com-
prehensive conceptual unities: theories, disciplines, attitudes, and worldviews. 
Philosophical synthesis requires analysis, but it does not come down to it, to 
the original concept, but creates the possibility of new, alternative concepts. If 
the analysis, according to Russell, leads from the known to the unknown, the 
4 Bertrand Russell, Logical Atomism (1924) // Bertrand Russell, Logic and Knowledge: Essays 
1901–1950 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1956), 341.
5 Alexander of Aphrodisias. Commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, §1.2.1. Cited in Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analysis/s1.html#Alexander.
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synthesis leads from the existing to the not yet existing. Synthesis is an act of 
thinking that becomes an event of being.
Immanuel Kant’s division of judgments into analytical and synthetical is 
fraught with a criticism of analytical philosophy, which overuses analytical 
judgments and thereby pushes philosophy to tautologism, i.e. turns thinking 
into a chain of clarifying, but equivalent, synonymous variations like: “all bod-
ies are extended,” “gold is yellow,” or “‘do not kill’ means ‘I condemn murder.’” 
Kant’s criticism is worth reading in full:
Analytical judgments express nothing in the predicate but what has been 
already actually thought in the concept of the subject, though not so dis-
tinctly or with the same (full) consciousness. When I say: “All bodies are 
extended,” I have not amplified in the least my concept of body, but have 
only analyzed it, as extension was really thought to belong to that con-
cept before the judgment was made, though it was not expressed. This 
judgment is therefore analytical.6
Synthetical judgments, on the contrary, amplify the concept and add some-
thing which is not already contained in it. Synthesis is not a repetition of the 
analysis in reverse order, from elements to the whole, but it is the formation of 
a new whole through the rearrangement of the initial elements, which consti-
tutes the very act of thought. Even if we narrow the subject of philosophy to 
language, then the measure of intellectual productivity would be to expand 
the existing language, synthesize new words and concepts, lexical and concep-
tual fields, introduce new grammatical rules, and increase the scope of the spo-
ken and, therefore, of the potentially thinkable and doable.
1.2 Problematization as a Transition from Analysis to Synthesis
Why is the transition from analysis to synthesis logically so difficult that analyt-
ical philosophy rarely grows into a synthetic one? The point is that synthesis is 
not a direct continuation of analysis, but a turning point of thinking that is now 
moving in the opposite direction, from parts to the whole. A key role in this 
turn is played by a logical operation that can be called problematization. Each 
element, deduced from the original concept, is problematized as one in the row 
of the possible elements that can replace it. It is a way to defamiliarize com-
mon sense that is so prone to tautologies. By problematizing the  analytically 
6 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics https://books.google.com/books? 
id=WAw3DAAAQBA J&pg=PA785&lpg=PA785&dq.
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isolated elements and replacing one of them with another element, we get a 
different concept (judgment, rule) that expands the domain of the thinkable.
We can understand the limitations of analytical judgement very clearly by 
considering a well-known example proposed by Kant: “All bachelors are un-
married.” The very concept of a bachelor is formed by a combination of these 
two elements: “man” and “unmarried.” If we just reconnect them, we get back 
to the original concept: an unmarried man is a bachelor. Synthesis without 
problematization does not add anything to the analysis, but only confirms its 
validity. Such is the tautological interchange between analysis and synthesis, if 
they are not mediated by problematization.
But let us expand the possibilities of such an analytical judgment by ask-
ing: in what sense is a man “unmarried”? Is he unmarried in fact—or out of 
principle, because he is opposed to marriage and does not want to be bound 
by marriage? Or perhaps there are certain physical or social conditions that 
prevent him from marriage? Then it would be more appropriate to use an-
other participle: unmarriable. The lexical system of language requires a new 
unit: “unmarriable”—the one who does not marry out of principle, because 
he is unable or unwilling to marry, essentially “unpaired,” “incompatible,” not 
designed for family life. This is the simplest example of a synthesis produced 
on the basis of analysis, when one of its elements, “unmarried,” is problema-
tized and supplemented by the alternative term “unmarriable.” It turns out 
that the word “bachelor” can have two different meanings, i.e. point to the 
two different human types. The analytical judgment that “all bachelors are 
unmarried” now can be supplemented with a synthetic one: “some bachelors 
are unmarriable.”
For example, the tragicomic element of Dostoevsky’s Idiot consists in the 
fact that two beautiful women compete for Myshkin, wanting to marry him, 
while he is in principle unmarriable, which he himself states at the beginning 
of the novel. This is the simplest example: the transition to the synthesis of 
new judgments through the analysis and problematization of trivial judg-
ments. Similarly, another element of this analytical judgment can be subject to 
problematization: “man.” What if it is a homosexual, or transgender, or non-
binary subject? Can we say that the absence of a permanent or legally regis-
tered partner makes them bachelors? Are the very terms “married” or “unmar-
ried” applicable to them? Such problematization opens a new space for 
synthetic thinking which is now in growing demand due to ethical, psychologi-
cal, legal, and political concerns about gender issues.
As we see in this example, synthetic operations that arise on the basis of 
even a trivial analytic proposition are far from trivial and help to enrich the 
language of thinking. But they are triggered only by problematization, and this 
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is the main stumbling block in the transition from philosophical analysis to 
synthesis. Analysis, brought to the smallest logical atoms, turns out to be in-
tellectually trivial, if these atoms are devoid of movement, “vibrations” and 
their positions in the logical structure are fixed and irreplaceable. The prob-
lem of analytical philosophy is that it is insufficiently problematic; it does not 
question those elements that are obtained from the analysis of a judgment. 
This problem can only be solved by the problematization of analysis itself as 
a philosophical method, offering an alternative to it and showing that prob-
lematization itself forms the crucial moment in the transition from analysis 
to synthesis.
1.3 Examples of Philosophical Synthesis: Concept, Judgment, Rule, 
Discipline
Now I will provide several examples of such a triple operation: from analysis—
through problematization—to synthesis. I will consider synthesis on four rising 
levels of thinking: concept, judgment, rule, discipline.
1. Synthesis of the concept: infinition. Analytical philosophy likes to use clear 
definitions, and “definition” is one of its main terms. From the analytical point 
of view, the definition consists of definable and defining (definiendum and 
definiens), between which the relation of semantic equivalence is established. 
But what if this equivalence cannot be established within a definition? Are all 
concepts definable? Can the definition itself include a moment of self- 
criticism, i.e. point to the indeterminateness of this concept?
By problematizing this “definition,” we come to a new, alternative notion—
the infinition. This term is a blend of two words, definition and infinity originat-
ing from one Latin root finis, the end, the limit: Definition is the definition of 
what is definable. Infinition is the definition of what is undefinable.
Infinition is an infinitely deferred definition that demonstrates the multi-
plicity of possible definitions and simultaneously the inadequacy of each of 
them and the impossibility of a complete definition as such. Infinition is an 
incomplete and unfinalizable definition, an infinite process of defining some-
thing that cannot be fully or precisely defined, an endless list of possible 
definitions.
The term infinition is an example of a linguistic synthesis based on the anal-
ysis of the concept of definition:
a. The starting point, thesis: definition is a concise description or explana-
tion of the meaning of a word, term, or concept.
b. Analytical dissection, or logical bifurcation: a word or a concept can be 
definable or indefinable, i.e. not capable of being precisely described.
c. Synthesis: infinition is a definition of something that is indefinable.
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Certain fluid concepts in their emergent state are subject to infinition— infinite 
dispersal of their meaning—rather than to definition. We can find many ex-
amples of infinition in philosophy and religious thought. They abound in the 
writings of Lao Tzu, Chuang Tzu and other Taoist thinkers; in the treatises of 
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and apophatic theology; and in the works of 
Jacques Derrida and other followers of deconstruction.
For example, Lao Tse never gives a definition of Tao, but only multiple infi-
nitions: “The Tao that can be trodden is not the enduring and unchanging Tao. 
The name that can be named is not the enduring and unchanging name” (The 
Tao Te Ching, Ch. 1, 1–2). Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite offers infinitions of 
the Cause of Everything: “We therefore maintain that the universal and tran-
scendent Cause of all things is neither without being nor without life, nor with-
out reason or intelligence; nor is it a body, nor has it form or shape, quality, 
quantity or weight” (Mystical Theology, Ch. 4). Jacques Derrida never defines 
his method of deconstruction, but only infines it: “What deconstruction is not? 
Everything of course! What is deconstruction? Nothing of course!” (“Letter to a 
Japanese Friend”).
The most foundational concepts of any philosophical system, such as God, 
Being, Absolute, Spirit, Beauty, or Love, are not definable within these systems. 
Each discipline has its own primary concepts, such as wisdom in philosophy, 
soul or mind in psychology, and word in linguistics, which are subject to infini-
tions. In fact, any system of thinking has at its basis certain concepts that can-
not be defined within its framework but are used to define other concepts de-
rived from them. This is an example of a philosophical synthesis: on the basis 
of the existing concept of definition, by analyzing and problematizing, i.e. criti-
cally examining its elements, the notion of infinition is constructed.
2. Synthesis of judgments. Every act of analysis contains the possibility and 
condition of a new synthesis. Where there is a possibility of breaking a judg-
ment into elements, there also exists a possibility of new judgments, a new 
combination of elements and, therefore, a new domain of thought and speech. 
For instance, the judgment “stupidity is a vice” can be treated analytically, in 
the spirit of George Moore, i.e. as equivalent to such judgments as “I have a 
negative attitude towards stupidity,” or “Stupidity evokes negative emotions in 
me.” The synthetic approach to this judgment, however, positions it as a poten-
tial foundation for other, alternative and more informative, “wondrous” judg-
ments (cf. Aristotle’s idea expressed in Metaphysics about philosophy born out 
of wonderment).
Let us create a possible sequence of questions and alternative judgments 
regarding the statement “Stupidity is a vice.” Is stupidity always a vice, or can it 
be considered, in certain cases, a virtue? If intelligence can be exercised for a 
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sophisticated justification of a vice, then can innocence serve as a justification 
of stupidity? If stupidity is sometimes used as a means to a virtuous goal, can it 
then itself be considered a virtue? Mikhail Saltykov-Shchedrin, a prominent 
Russian satiric writer of the nineteenth century, coined a remarkable moral 
term that has come into general usage in Russian: “blagoglupost’” (blago + 
 glupost’, meaning “virtuous + stupidity”), which can be conveyed by the Eng-
lish neologism “virtupidity.” “Virtupidity” is well-intentioned stupidity, high-
sounding nonsense, or pompous triviality.
Let us take our interrogation to the next level. If stupidity, even only in an 
ironic sense, can be a virtue, can baseness or meanness be virtuous, as well? 
Can we speak about “well-intentioned meanness”? Can we speak not only of 
“virtupidity,” but also “benemalence” (from Latin bene, meaning “well” and ma-
lus, meaning “bad”; cf. “benevolence” and “malice”) as “well-intentioned mean-
ness”? “Benemalence” appears at first sight to be a dubious oxymoron. Lack of 
intelligence can go hand-in-hand with good intentions, but can the same be 
said about the malicious and perverse intentions? Can one betray, rape, and 
blaspheme while having good intentions? The answer is “yes,” as evidenced by 
the examples ranging from the Grand Inquisitor in Dostoevsky’s The Brothers 
Karamazov to the exemplary pioneer Pavlik Morozov, a Soviet official hero 
who became notorious for denouncing and betraying his father.
Thus, as a trivial subject of analysis, the judgment “stupidity is a vice” can set 
up grounds for a synthesis of non-trivial, thought-provoking judgments and 
new word formations, such as “virtupidity” and “benemalence.” Language syn-
thesis can be formally operationalized by the symbol ÷ as the sign of logical 
bifurcation, i.e. an alternative emerging from the analysis of the aforemen-
tioned judgment. The elements of the judgment which precede the sign ÷ are 
viewed as variables, whereas their alternatives or variations that follow are the 
new judgments:
Stupidity is a vice (a trivial judgment).
Problematization:
Stupidity can be ÷ a vice (but may not be).
Stupidity can be ÷ a virtue (under certain circumstances).
Synthesis:
One of the conditions of virtue is a good intention.
Stupidity can be the product of good intentions: “Virtupidity.”
Meanness can be the product of good intentions: “Benemalence.”
Every element of any judgment can be questioned and substituted by another 
one, generating a new judgment. For instance, if the elements a, b, and c can be 
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isolated in a judgment as a result of analysis, their synthesis generates the com-
binations acb, bca, cba, and bac, i.e. a new thought, a mental object yet to be 
cognized, requiring interpretation, and a new act of analysis to be followed by 
a new synthesis.
Gottfried Leibniz considered the art of synthesis to be more important than 
that of analysis. For him, synthesis is defined as the algebra of qualities, or 
combinatorics which deals with forms of objects or formulas of the Universe, 
i.e. the quality in general, for these formulas are the result of the combination 
of the initial elements a, b, c, etc., and this science is different from algebra, 
which manipulates formulas as they apply to the quantity.7
3. Synthesis of the ethical postulate: a diamond rule. Another example is syn-
thesis on a larger scale: not one concept or judgment, but an ethical rule, or a 
postulate, or a maxim. I shall proceed from the golden rule of morality, which 
was independently formulated by Confucius, the Jewish sage Hillel, and Jesus 
in the Sermon on the Mount: “In everything, do to others what you would have 
them do to you” (Matthew 7:12). To find a proper way to treat others, you should 
put yourself in the place of someone else.
An analysis of this commandment leads to the separation of the ethical 
subject and object, “the self” and “the other,” but the relationship between 
them is presumed to be completely reversible. How X wants Y to do to him, let 
X do to Y.
But X and Y are different persons with dissimilar abilities and dissimilar 
needs. Therefore, it is permissible to synthesize a different rule: let everyone use 
their greatest abilities to fulfill the greatest needs of other people. Do what others 
need most and what no one can do better than you. If you are a violinist by your 
gift and calling, then playing the violin rather than chopping wood is the fulfill-
ment of your moral duty, contrary to what the unenlightened masses or totali-
tarian regimes presume, willingly using the golden rule for levelling people. 
The Russian poet Marina Tsvetaeva, forced to emigrate and to do mechanical 
labor, remarked in her diary: “I am not a parasite, because I work and I want 
nothing else but to work: but my own work, not somebody else’s.” In this case, 
this is to compose one’s own verses, not to translate those composed by 
others.
Thus, I propose a postulate that does not annul the golden rule, but rather 
sets a diamond of an individual gift in its “golden frame”: Do that good to others 
that nobody can do better than you. From this perspective, the best action is 
7 Gottfried W. Leibniz, “On Universal Synthesis and Analysis, or the Art of Discovery and Judg-
ment,” in Philosophical Papers and Letters, ed. L.E. Loemker, The New Synthese Historical Li-
brary (Texts and Studies in the History of Philosophy) vol 2. (Dordrecht: Springer, 1989), 234.
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that which corresponds to the needs of the largest number and the capacities of 
the smallest number of people. The first criterion is the “golden” universality of 
a moral act, while the second criterion focuses on its “diamond-like” unique-
ness. By questioning one of the elements of the golden rule (reversibility of the 
subject and the object), we get another, diamond one, as an answer.
4. Synthesis of a discipline. Horrorology. “Civilization studies” or “cultural 
studies”—an academically established discipline taught at many  universities—
explores various aspects of civilization: from history to science, from art to 
technology. Over the past decades, especially since the terrorist attacks of 2001 
in New York, civilization revealed a property that previously was not so obvi-
ous: its growing fragility. I do not mean military forces and weapons that had 
always been designed for destruction; rather, I refer to the hidden self- 
destructive potential of civilization itself. The more complex our urban con-
structions and communication systems are, the more fragile and vulnerable 
civilization becomes.
Goethe anticipated this bitter irony of civilization in the second part of 
Faust. Faust believes that he creates a dam and pushes the sea away from the 
shores to build a city for the free people, whereas Mephistopheles, who alleg-
edly is carrying out this cherished plan of Faust, has something completely 
different in mind: to drive as many people as possible to the seashore for their 
eventual absorption by the sea. This hidden Mephistophelian irony can be 
seen in all the noble endeavors of Faust; similarly, the same self-destructive 
irony can be perceived in all daring endeavors of civilization.
Therefore, the study of civilization must be problematized—and supple-
mented with a discipline that examines its own subversive, shadow side. I con-
ditionally call this discipline “horrorology,” а rather dissonant term, as it de-
scribes the potential horror that is hidden in the allegedly most peaceful and 
prosperous creations of civilization: from architecture and aviation to medi-
cine and computing. The higher the skyscrapers, the more powerful the 
 aircraft—the easier it is to send these latter against the former and by mutual 
collision destroy both. As the terrorist act of September 11, 2001 showed, no 
special weapon against civilization is needed; civilization provides a range of 
weapons that can be used against itself. In fact, any artefact can become a 
weapon—for example, prescription drugs that can be deadly and addictive, or 
a computer program that is easy to reprogram so as to create chaos in commu-
nication systems. So many forms of the most advanced technologies can put 
humanity at risk that practically any of them deserves its own horrological 
study. For instance, the Internet, with myriad viruses spreading throughout 
computer networks, or artificial intelligence is capable of mentally subordinat-
ing and eventually destroying its human creators.
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If the fear of pollution—civilization’s threat to nature—haunted the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century, then the twenty-first century may fall prey to 
the horror: the threats of civilization to itself. Ecology, as the primary concern 
of humanity, is succeeded by horrology that explores civilization as a system of 
traps and self-exploding devices, and humankind as a hostage of its own cre-
ations. Horrology as a discipline is the reverse of all other disciplines that study 
civilization. It is a negative science of civilization: hence nega–technology, 
nega–architecture, nega-sociology, nega-politics, and nega-aesthetics as 
branches of horrology. Everything studied by other disciplines as positive at-
tributes and structural properties of civilization, horrology studies as the 
grounds of its self-destruction.
This is an example of the synthesis of a new discipline from those elements 
of which the study of civilization is made. Through the analysis of civilization, 
we can problematize those “reversible” elements that can easily turn every cre-
ative act into a destructive one.
2 Part ii: How a Philosophy of Synthesis Can Transform the World
Numerous universes might have been botched and bungled throughout 
an eternity, ere this system was struck out; much labor lost, many fruitless 
trials made, and a slow but continual improvement carried out during 
infinite ages in the art of world-making.
David Hume
2.1 Synthesis as Transformation
The philosophy of synthesis includes at least three levels: objective, systematic 
and transformative. The first level is a synthesis of new mental objects, of those 
conceptual (logical, semantic, linguistic) elements from which a new term, 
concept, rule, or discipline is composed (as described in Part 1). The second is 
metasynthesis, a shift from concrete, targeted interventions and innovations, 
such as a new concept or discipline, to a systematic construction of alternative 
pictures of the world, to the synthesis of a whole system of new methods and 
disciplines. This level is considered in a number of my works, to which, due to 
the length limitations of this article, I simply refer the reader.8 The third level 
8 See Mikhail Epstein, A Philosophy of the Possible: Modalities in Thought and Culture, trans. 
from Russian by Vern W. McGee and Marina Eskina (Boston, Leiden et al.: Brill Academic / 
Rodopi [Value Inquiry Book Series], 2019), 365 pp.; Mikhail Epstein, The Transformative 
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is transformative: moving beyond the limits of philosophical thinking as such 
towards its synthesis with those practices—technical, cultural, artistic, 
 communicative—that determine the life of society.
1. To form new concepts (terms, rules, disciplines);
2. to systematize the methods of their generation;
3. and to direct them toward the transformation of certain spheres of being: 
such is the threefold task of the philosophy of synthesis, the sequence of 
its steps.
Philosophy must determine for itself those methods of action that are specific 
to it, in contrast to science and technology, politics and art. What is the practi-
cal benefit of philosophical synthesis for contemporary technocentric society? 
Is philosophy doomed to be enclosed in the academic sphere of research and 
teaching? Or, while remaining faithful to its tradition and its vocation, but us-
ing a synthetic methodology, can it powerfully influence the path of social de-
velopment, as the driving force of civilization, which it was at the time of Plato 
and Aristotle, Kant and Hegel? In this second section, I will discuss the voca-
tion of philosophy in the twenty-first century, the ways of its engagement with 
social and intellectual movements and advanced sciences and technologies.
The direction that philosophy clearly took after the Kant’s “Copernican” 
revolution was the strengthening of practical reason, with the aim of active 
transformation of the world. This was expressed in the famous eleventh thesis 
of Karl Marx: “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various 
ways; the point is to change it” (“Theses on Feuerbach”). The thesis calls di-
rectly for the transition of philosophy from theory to practice, but a frightening 
asymmetry is hidden in Marx’s formulation: “in various ways” refers only to 
“interpret,” but not to “change.” Changing the world uniformly, according to 
only one plan, means exposing it to the risk of devastating consequences, as 
the totalitarian outcomes of Marxism in the twentieth century make abun-
dantly clear. The philosophy of the twenty-first century, learning the sad lesson 
of transformism reduced to militant uniformism, should be prepared to follow 
the call to “change,” only adding to it “in various ways.” That is, acting pluralisti-
cally, increasing rather than reducing diversity, moving in different directions 
through the multiplicity of alternative philosophical practices.
 Humanities: A Manifesto, trans and ed. by Igor Kliukanov (New York and London: Blooms-
bury Academic, 2012. 318 p.; Mikhail Epstein, After the Future: The Paradoxes of Postmodern-
ism and Contemporary Russian Culture, trans with introd. by A. Miller–Pogacar (Amherst: U 
of Massachusetts P, 1995). 392 pp.
 Please check the unpaired parenthesis in the sentence “New York and London…”.
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2.2 Problematization of the Existing World and Projections of Its 
Alternatives
Philosophy is distinct from other fields of inquiry by its focus on the most fun-
damental truths about the world as such, in its entirety, as a generic unit of 
thinking. Arthur Schopenhauer exclaimed: “The world, the world, asses! this is 
the problem of philosophy, the world and nothing else!”9
Furthermore, metaphysics is commonly defined as the most general branch 
of philosophy that deals with the nature and structure of the world as a whole. 
Of all philosophical disciplines (including epistemology, logic, ethics, and aes-
thetics), metaphysics appears to be the least practical as it addresses the broad-
est questions regarding “being as such” or “the first causes of things.” Thus, 
metaphysics can serve as a useful testing ground for the examination of the 
practical applications of philosophy. If metaphysics can be used as an engi-
neering tool and a site for practical construction, then philosophy in principle 
has the potential to change the world which it studies.
What are then these entities that we call worlds, and can we use this term in 
the plural? A world is everything that exists within one set of laws and is united 
by the interaction of its parts according to these laws. A most graphic speci-
men of a world as a single unit would be Narnia by C.S. Lewis, Middle–Earth by 
J.R.R. Tolkien or any sufficiently developed, immersive computer game. In this 
way, the first task that the creators of computer games should solve is a meta-
physical one: what are the initial parameters of the virtual world in which the 
action takes place, how many dimensions are there, how does time flow and 
space unfold, how many actions, steps, blows are permitted to the gamers ac-
cording to the conditions of their life, and what is considered a condition of 
death?
If the foundational unit of metaphysical thinking is a world as whole, meta-
physics was traditionally set apart from more specific, positivistic disciplines 
discussing particular aspects of the world. In order to be positive and practical, 
a discipline has to compare various manifestations of generic laws and proper-
ties: for example, various substances and elements (chemistry), organisms (bi-
ology), or languages (linguistics). Metaphysics, however, has had at its disposal 
only one world—the one in which we live. Respectively, philosophers debated 
over what constitutes the beginning or the first principle of this world. Is it 
composed of water or fire (Thales or Heraclitus)? Which is preeminent—a uni-
versal or an individual (Realism or Nominalism)? Is the world ideal or material 
in its foundations (Hegel or Marx)? These philosophies—however brilliantly 
9 A note of Schopenhauer from his manuscript. Quoted in W. Schirmacher, “Schopenhauers 
Wirkung: Ein Philosoph wird neu gelesen,” Prisma 2, (1989), 25.
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espoused and internally coherent—all remained speculative in that they sim-
ply extracted various qualities from the same single world and hypostasized 
them into general principles, while the world itself remained unchanged.
Now, with the assumption of a multiplicity of worlds in contemporary phys-
ics and with the proliferation of simulated worlds in digital technologies, we 
can look at the range of possible applications of metaphysics differently. Jon 
Turney identifies three types of computerized worlds: (1) mirror worlds that 
are ultra-detailed models of actual worlds, such as Google Earth; (2) augment-
ed realities where information comes through artificial devices, such as glasses 
or wired contact lenses; (3) immersive virtual environments, or fully realized 
virtual worlds, where you can send your computer-controlled avatar. As infor-
mation technology progresses from mirror worlds to immersive worlds, which 
encompass self-contained universes in them, metaphysics will get a better 
ground for the realization of its world-forming visions.10
Any computer game, any virtual world contains the properties of “world-
ness,” which forms a specific subject and concern of metaphysics. Moreover, 
the scale of such “little worlds” is growing rapidly, from the most primitive ac-
tion game to Second Life, the design-your-own-avatar online world launched in 
2003, and five years later populated by fifteen million people from one hundred 
countries, who can participate in individual and group activities, creating and 
trading items of virtual property. This territory has its own houses, businesses, 
laws, monetary units (lindens that can be exchanged for real dollars). The gross 
domestic product of Second Life in 2015 alone reached half a billion dollars 
(more than in some real countries). This is not just about a new transcontinen-
tal and transnational territory, but an alternative universe that potentially has 
its own ontology and logic, its own laws of space and time, chance and fate, its 
own metaphysical matrix, which is laid at the basis of its technical construc-
tion and software.
Whenever we are talking about the whole world, philosophical categories 
inevitably come into its description, because their specific content is precisely 
the worldness of the world. With that in mind, why not turn our thoughts 
to the next possible stage, when virtual technology will be able to produce 
something like Tlön, a world from Jorge Luis Borges’ story Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis 
Tertius? In order to describe this world in its worldness, which is based in 
thought only, Borges has to resort to philosophical arguments and refer to 
thinkers of the past:
10 Jon Turney, The Rough Guide to the Future (London: Rough Guides, 2010), 306–07.
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Hume noted for all time that Berkeley’s arguments did not admit the 
slightest refutation, nor did they cause the slightest conviction. This dic-
tum is entirely correct in its application to the earth, but entirely false in 
Tlön. The nations of this planet are congenitally idealist. Their language 
and the derivations of their language—religion, letters, metaphysics—
all presuppose idealism. The world for them is not a concourse of objects 
in space; it is a heterogeneous series of independent acts. … [T]he men of 
this planet conceive the universe as a series of mental processes which do 
not develop in space but successively in time. Spinoza ascribes to his in-
exhaustible divinity the attributes of extension and thought; no one in 
Tlön would understand [this] juxtaposition (1983, pp. 8–9).
We can see how the philosophical ideas of Hume, Berkeley, and Spinoza turn 
out to be indispensable when considering what would make one world, Tlön, 
so different from our familiar Earth. This example shows how certain meta-
physical assumptions, idealistic in this case, are incorporated in the construc-
tion of possible worlds and thus may have a direct impact on the technologies 
that produce these worlds. Inventors of computer games must first of all set 
metaphysical parameters for the world in which action will take place. To that 
end, the following questions must be addressed: how many dimensions does 
the world contain? What is the nature of time and space in it, and do they con-
stitute one indivisible continuum? What are the relationships between subject 
and object, and cause and effect? How many moves or hits is each avatar al-
lowed? And what constitute the conditions for each avatar’s death or disap-
pearance from the game?
But in order to synthesize a new world, not just in fiction or in a computer 
game, we have to analyze and to problematize the existing world, to ques-
tion its foundations and major parameters. Does a world need to be made of 
physical substances or can it be composed of actions and events and thus de-
scribed by verbs more adequately than by nouns? Does a living entity need 
to be mortal or is there a mechanism in its genetic and informational setup 
that can provide for its practical immortality? Is the capacity to think and pro-
duce ideas inexorably linked to the brain or are there other potential vehicles 
of intelligence? It is difficult to problematize the entire world, the only form 
of life and the only biological mind that for millennia were uniquely given 
and known to us. But this is precisely what contemporary science is attempt-
ing to do: to problematize the existing world and its most fundamental laws. 
And this is precisely what contemporary technology strives to do: to synthe-
size new forms of life and intelligence on the basis of their deep analysis and 
problematization.
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2.3 New Relationships of Philosophy and Technology: Collaboration in 
World-Making
What is thus brought to light is a new relationship between philosophy and the 
advanced technologies that I call onto-technologies, because they change the 
foundations of being and the way in which we experience it. In the past, tech-
nology was preoccupied with material particulars, while taking care of con-
crete human needs, such as food, shelter, and transportation. Philosophy, in its 
turn, was preoccupied with big ideas, the first principles, essences, and univer-
sals. Technology used to be utilitarian, while philosophy was speculative. To-
day, technology and philosophy are moving ever closer towards each other: the 
power of technology is extended to the fundamental properties of the uni-
verse, while philosophy becomes increasingly active in its ability to define and 
change these properties. Technologies of the late twentieth and especially the 
early twenty-first centuries are no longer applied tools, but fundamental tech-
nologies making transformative advances into the micro- and macro-worlds, 
including the structure of the brain and dna. Such advances make it possible 
for us to penetrate into the very foundations of being, potentially changing its 
original parameters or setting up parameters for new kinds of being. Onto- 
technology has the power to create a new spatio-temporal continuum, a new 
sensory environment and modes of its perception (like in the virtual cocoon), 
along with new kinds of organisms and new forms of intelligence. Nano- 
technologies provide the means for the production of any object of desirable 
qualities and proportions from the elementary particles of matter. Humans are 
becoming increasingly skilful and successful in the art of world-making. As a 
result, technology is now moving not away from, but towards, metaphysics; this 
way, the two of them are meeting at the very core of being, where the princi-
ples traditionally studied by philosophy can be changed by technology.
A new synthesis of philosophy and technology is taking the form of techno-
sophia: a technically armed philosophy or philosophically oriented technology. 
Technosophia establishes the first principles not only in theoretical thought, 
but also in practical action through alternative forms of matter, life, and mind. 
With recent breakthroughs in physics, cosmology, genetics, and computer 
technologies, worldness as the primary interest of metaphysics is now expand-
ed into a multiverse in its multiple forms and alternative branches. With the 
advent of the multiverse, metaphysics ceases to be a discipline that speculates 
about the foundations of one world. Instead, it becomes a practical discipline 
of constructing worlds with various properties, laws, and universals.
Analytic philosophy, which is committed only to the analysis of texts, split-
ting them into increasingly thin, hair-like notions, is not ready for the solution 
and even the formulation of such technosophical problems. On the contrary, 
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the philosophy of synthesis can become an integral part of the synthetic meth-
odology of science, as outlined by Christopher Langton, the founder of syn-
thetic biology as the theory and practice of artificial life: “Part of what artificial 
life is all about, and part of the broader scheme that I just call synthetic biology 
in general, is probing beyond, pushing beyond the envelope of what occurred 
naturally.”11 John Horgan argues, moreover, that at the limits of contemporary 
science, such a synthetic methodology offers new horizons and possibilities:
Science had obviously made enormous progress by breaking things up 
into pieces and studying those pieces. But that methodology provided 
only limited understanding of higher-level phenomena, which were 
created to a large extent through historical accidents. One could tran-
scend those limitations, however, through a synthetic methodology, 
in which the basic components of existence were put together in new 
ways in computers to explore what might have happened or could have 
happened.12
New digital technologies stimulate the development of new methodologies 
that look not so much for the units of analysis at their boundaries—“atoms” in 
its field, so to speak—as for such methods of synthesizing them that would 
broaden the very field of the phenomena under study. Similarly, “synthetic 
metaphysics” is capable of synthesizing worlds possessing various sets of laws 
and universals. This perspective involves high-level programming that will 
model diverse relationships between determinism and indeterminism, or reg-
ularity and chance, and other world-building categories. It is possible to con-
struct existentialist and essentialist, materialist and idealist worlds, those of 
“to be” and “to have,” and worlds with various numbers of spatial dimensions 
and with the flow of time in reverse. We can imagine and potentially imple-
ment various virtual realities, for example, the Thalesian and Heraclitean 
worlds, or the Spinozian and Hegelian worlds. These “watery,” “fiery,” pantheist 
or panlogical worlds have their own metaphysical truth and value. Why should 
we exclude one for the sake of another and reduce the scale and wealth of 
worldness to one single world?
Using the synthetic “metaworld” matrix, we will be able not only to experi-
ment with the properties of existing metaphysical systems, but also to con-
struct and test new ones. Along with Kantian, Nietzschean, Whiteheadian, and 
11 John Horgan, The End of Science: Facing the Limits Of Knowledge In The Twilight of the 
Scientific Age, new ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2015), 199.
12 John Horgan, 200.
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Heideggerian worlds, the worlds of yet undescribed qualities could be synthe-
sized experimentally by the modification and combination of diverse param-
eters. This will transform the entire area of metaphysics into an experimental 
and constructive branch of knowledge, a humanistic technology that will ex-
plore the conditions of various worlds in comparative perspective. The Meta-
World, as a program, will be regulated by knobs/categories, such as “causality,” 
“chance,” “event,” “action,” “dialogue,” “matter,” “objectivity,” “perception,” and 
“selfness”—all of which could be adjusted to different levels of intensity. Rath-
er than the escapism so leveled at those who engage in virtual worlds, one posi-
tive “side effect” of such a program would be that by experimenting through 
the avatars with conditions of numerous worlds, users will develop their better 
self-awareness and understanding of the real world in which they live.
In fact, in the construction of a virtual world, programmers, engineers, and 
web designers are all invited to follow in the footsteps of the philosopher, who, 
as a demiurge of this particular world, formulates its foundational laws to be 
subsequently enacted technologically into material reality by other specialists. 
If a philosopher withdraws from this foundational act of thinking “world-wise,” 
then a computer specialist, a software engineer, a game designer and enter-
tainer will inadvertently take upon themselves the role of a philosopher, be-
cause a world, even within a primitive game, cannot exist without a certain 
metaphysics as a system of laws and universals. However, web wizards or game 
designers certainly are not philosophers; that is why the worlds produced in 
their workshops are metaphysically so plain and trivial. Those who are genuine 
philosophers by vocation and education must fill this huge professional niche 
formed by the accelerated processes of world-making across so many disci-
plines and occupations.
Some university departments of computing and informational technologies 
already collaborate with history departments in producing games with histori-
cal content, for example, games set in the Elizabethan era or World War ii. One 
can foresee philosophy departments following this example and engaging in 
strategic decisions about the nature of virtual worlds in the making. Simulated 
worlds increasingly become intrinsically philosophical as information tech-
nologies become more advanced and broaden the scope of their application 
from material details to the worldness of the world.
Syntheticism—the theory and practice of constructing new worlds and 
 beings—promises to become a direction in philosophy that appears to be 
more potent and congruous with the advanced technologies of today than any 
other philosophical “-ism” of the past. Syntheticism is a philosophy of emerging 
worlds that, based on certain metaphysical matrices, can be implemented by 
using new information technologies, nanotechnologies, bio-technologies and 
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neuro-technologies. A turn from analysis to synthesis is exigent for philosophy 
if it does not want to turn completely into the scholastic history of philosophy 
and still aspires to be relevant in the future/for the future.
2.4 A New Vocation for Philosophy
Previously, when there was only one world at our disposal, philosophy had to 
stay a speculative, abstract science. With the development of computer tech-
nology and the physical and mathematical arguments for the multiverse, the 
possibility of practical construction of other worlds opens up, and philosophy 
for the first time in history finds its practical destination and becomes a super-
technology for the first day of creation.
In this light, technological progress prepares a new role for the philosopher 
as a metaphysical engineer or a world designer. In the past, the philosopher pro-
nounced the last word about the world, consummating it in thought. For in-
stance, G.W.F. Hegel was fond of repeating the maxim that “the owl of Minerva 
spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk.”13 In the world of tomorrow, 
the philosopher will more closely resemble a skylark or even a rooster, pro-
claiming the dawn of a new creative day. The twenty-first century introduces, 
at least potentially, alternative varieties of life and intelligence, such as the en-
hancement of brain capacity with the help of artificial devices and the explo-
ration of holes and tunnels in a space and time continuum. Philosophy, there-
fore, is no longer mere speculation about the first principles, but an experiment 
in the conceptual production of multiple worlds—be it the creation of a com-
puter game or a parallel universe with the quality of worldness.
The features of the new stage in the movement of thought are clarified by 
comparison with those results of world-historical development that are re-
flected in Hegel’s system of absolute idealism. According to Hegel, philosophy 
completes the works of the absolute idea of self-development and self- 
knowledge through the worlds of nature and history:
The present standpoint of philosophy is that the Idea is known in its ne-
cessity; the sides of its diremption, Nature and Spirit, are each of them 
recognized as representing the totality of the Idea […] The ultimate aim 
and business of philosophy is to reconcile thought or the Notion with 
reality […] To this point the World-spirit has come, and each stage has its 
own form in the true system of Philosophy; nothing is lost, all principles 
are preserved, since Philosophy in its final aspect is the totality of forms. 
13 G.W.F Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford U P, 1967), 13.
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This concrete idea is the result of the strivings of spirit during almost 
twenty-five centuries of earnest work to become objective to itself, to 
know itself […]14
Now, two hundred years after this exhaustive statement, it becomes clear that 
the history of philosophy is far from consummation. It was only the prehistory 
of philosophy, its speculative, interpretive stage, whereas now philosophy can 
enter a truly transformative stage when it opens perspectives on inexhaustible 
potentials of thinking in the creation of new worlds. Therefore, we can re-
phrase Hegel in the following way:
The current stage of philosophy reveals its potential to transcend the lim-
its of nature and history. The goal and aspiration of philosophy is to go 
beyond reality and to conceive new forms of being even before scientists, 
engineers and other practitioners of positive disciplines can engage in 
them… The “world spirit” has tested itself in the cognition of reality as it 
is and has entered the realm of the conceivable-thinkable-possible. Each 
form of future finds in philosophy its preliminary way of understanding 
and projection. Philosophy becomes the starting point of experimental 
work on the radical renewal of being and the creative design of new 
worlds. This idea is the result of the efforts of the spirit to become objec-
tive for itself, to know itself as the beginning of the existing world—in 
order to lay the foundations for previously non-existent worlds.
From multiple interpretations of one world, philosophy moves on to multiple 
initiations of different worlds. Philosophy is not at the end, but at the begin-
ning of those forms of matter and being that do not fit into reality and reveal 
their energy and potentiality in constructive excess, in the embryos of new 
existences. Just as an engineer is a producer of mechanisms; an artist of paint-
ings, and a politician of institutions and laws; so too is a philosopher a pro-
ducer of worlds. His professional duty is the expansion of worldness, the cre-
ation of universals that enhance the universe into multiverse. He is called 
upon to know, in the Hegelian sense, the rational in the real, not in order to 
“justify” reality as it is, but to find the super-real in reason itself and call upon 
it to create new kinds of being.
14 G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Section Three: Recent German Phi-
losophy E. Final Result. https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hp/
hpfinal.htm.
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The twentieth century was an age of grandiose physical experiments, but 
the twenty-first century promises to become a laboratory of even more large-
scale metaphysical experiments related to free will, the role of chance, the 
problem of possible worlds, and the paradoxes of twins, doubles, and clones. 
Physical experiments turn metaphysical when the conditions are ripe for radi-
cal technological transformations, like the synthesis of substances and objects 
with desired properties at the nanolevel or modifications of the genome and 
creation of new types of organisms. For example, cloning is not just biological 
or genetic experience; it is an experiment on the relation of human personality 
to the body, on the identity or difference of individuals in case of genetic iden-
tity. Michio Kaku, for example, sees the issue of our doubles, or clones in the 
parallel quantum worlds, as one of the great ethical and metaphysical con-
cerns: “Are we responsible for our clone’s actions? In a quantum universe, we 
would have an infinite number of quantum clones. Since some of our quantum 
clones might perform acts of evil, are we then responsible for them? Does our 
soul suffer for the transgressions of our quantum clones?”15
Similar problems may emerge with our digital avatars or the new power of 
the brain-computer interface. For instance, am I responsible for the actions of 
an individual who is genetically identical to myself? Or, with the creation of 
wireless links between human brains and external electronics, how can my 
uncontrollable thoughts impact the surrounding world? If my brain is en-
hanced by the prostheses that transmit the energy of neural signals directly to 
mighty factory-like machines, this enormously increases my responsibility for 
the contents of my thinking as compared with the time when it was impene-
trably constrained within the cranium.
Therefore, one cannot agree with the pessimistic assertions of Richard Rorty 
that the opinions of philosophers on how consciousness relates to the brain or 
what place values occupy in the world of facts, or how determinism and free 
will can be reconciled, are not of interest to most modern intellectuals. The 
result was, in Richard Rorty’s judgment, the cultural marginalization of phi-
losophy, which is why the profession has become largely irrelevant to wider 
public discourse:
This consensus among the intellectuals has moved philosophy to the 
margins of culture. Such controversies as those between Russell and 
Bergson, Heidegger and Cassirer, Carnap and Quine, Ayer and Austin, 
Habermas and Gadamer, and Fodor and Davidson, have had no  resonance 
15 Michio Kaku, Parallel Worlds: The Science of Alternative Universes and Our Future in the 
Cosmos (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 353.
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outside the borders of philosophy departments. Philosophers’ explana-
tions of how the mind is related to the brain, or of how there can be a 
place of value in a world of fact, or of how free will and mechanism can 
be reconciled, do not intrigue most contemporary intellectuals. These 
problems, preserved in amber as the textbook “problems of philosophy,” 
still capture the imagination of some bright students. But no one would 
claim that discussion of them is central to intellectual life. Solving these 
very problems was all-important for contemporaries of Spinoza, but 
when today’s philosophy professors insist that they are “perennial,” or 
that they remain “fundamental,” nobody listens. Most intellectuals of our 
day brush aside claims that our social practices require philosophical 
foundations with the same impatience as when similar claims are made 
for religion.16
This is a tragic situation for philosophy: the more precise it attempts to be 
(partly by using analytic instruments), the more irrelevant it becomes. The 
point is not that the list of socially “irrelevant” discussions is fraught with the 
names of analytic philosophers. Even more deeply metaphysically grounded 
thinkers, like Bergson and Heidegger, if read through analytic lenses, lose their 
relevance. The very status of philosophy as the inquiry of the most fundamen-
tal truths about the existing world is faltering. Who cares! New worlds prolifer-
ate around us and appear to be almost as feasible as this one, and by far more 
interesting, imaginative and intriguing. Let physics and economy study the ex-
isting world on empirical grounds. Yet philosophy—especially metaphysics—
is called to something more ambitious: to become the experimental ground 
for the production of other worlds, universes and universals. The opinion of 
philosophers on the nature of brain may be not as relevant as that of neuro-
scientists and neurosurgeons, but the properly philosophical question about 
“how the mind is related to the brain” is now more relevant than ever before 
because its solution, or rather the variety of solutions, will have a direct impact 
on the future of human mind and brain relations and thus, it bears on our 
own fate. Society is not interested in philosophical speculations on what is and 
how it is because this information can be obtained from more reliable scien-
tific sources. Society is interested in philosophy inasmuch as it can offer bright 
visions and models of possible, contingent, necessary, inspiring, challenging 
worlds, in various formats: cinematic, digital, virtual, physical,  cosmological, 
16 Richard Rorty, “Universalist Grandeur, Romantic Profundity, Humanist Finitude,” Lecture 
at University of Pécs in Hungary, 3 May 2004, https://books.google.com/books?id=k0Jqf7i
ItdoC&pg=PA24&lpg=PA24&dq.
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mathematical, biological, ecological, genetic, cognitive, psychic, linguistic, and 
aesthetic formats. Our contemporaries, including intellectuals, do not want 
from philosophy more meticulous research but rather more grand-scale inspi-
ration. They want to experience how it feels to live in a world with numerous 
dimensions, with higher or lower degree of physical and social determinism. 
They want to experience what it is like to be a bat or an overman, a tree or a 
star. They want to expand the worldness of their experience, the scale of their 
feelings, thoughts, words and actions. Philosophy enters the epoch of extended 
modalities: not only what is, but what might be, what needs to be, what is desir-
able and what is thinkable.17
Thus, philosophical problems now acquire even more practical meaning 
than ever before, precisely because of the tremendous expansion of the ca-
pabilities of science and technology, leading to the formulation of more dar-
ing, unorthodox metaphysical schemes, or rather opportunities. No wonder 
Albert Einstein, in his “Remarks on Bertrand Russell’s Theory of Knowledge” 
noted: “The present difficulties of his science force the physicist to come to 
grips with philosophical problems to a greater degree than was the case with 
earlier generations.”18 Ironically, it is the physicist, Einstein, who criticizes 
the philosopher, Russell, for the latter’s, inherited from Hume, “fateful ‘fear 
of metaphysics’ […] which has come to be a malady of contemporary empiri-
cist philosophizing.”19 It is fair to substitute here “empiricist” for “analytic” as 
Russell was a more quintessential representative of analytic philosophy than 
of empiricism. Precisely because physics, cosmology, biology, computer sci-
ence, and cognitive science reach the foundations and boundaries of the ex-
isting universe, these sciences are inherently growing more philosophical. If 
academic philosophers, including representatives of the analytic tradition, in-
tently avoid these “grand, too grand” issues, out of “fear of metaphysics,” then 
scientists such as David Bohm, Roger Penrose, Stephen Hawking, John Barrow, 
Paul Davis, Frank Tipler, Ray Kurzweil, Francis Collins, Michio Kaku, Max Teg-
mark, Lee Smolin, Andrei Linde and many others will take the initiative. As a 
17 These multiple modalities of philosophical thinking, in the past, in the present and in the 
future, are broadly discussed in my book: Mikhail Epstein, A Philosophy of the Possible: 
Modalities in Thought and Culture, trans. from Russian by Vern W. McGee and Marina Es-
kina (Boston, Leiden et al.: Brill Academic/ Rodopi [Value Inquiry Book Series], 2019.
18 Albert Einstein, “Remarks on Bertrand Russell’s Theory of Knowledge”in The Philosophy 




 Please check the unpaired parenthesis in the sentence “Boston, Leiden…”.
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result, questions themselves do not cease to be deeply philosophical, similar to 
those over which Pythagoras, Plato, Descartes, Kant, and Hegel were struggling. 
Philosophical questions persist and are even sharpened and enhanced, but in 
the absence of interest from professional philosophers, they are transferred to 
the jurisdiction of physicists, mathematicians, biologists, and cybernetics, who 
effectively turn out to be more genuine heirs of great metaphysical traditions 
than employees of the departments of analytic philosophy.
In conclusion, the foundational principles of existence, formerly considered 
predetermined and unchangeable, today are problematized by science and 
transformed by technology into metaphysically challenging models of new 
worldwide realities. With this transformative turn, not a single aspect of the 
philosophical heritage will be lost or neglected in this new technosophical field. 
All knowledge proceeding from past systems and schools of thought can be 
reemployed in the problematization of the existing world and conceptual de-
sign of alternative worlds.
Metaphysics applied to the art of world-making is just one example of how 
philosophy can find a new vocation in the age of advanced technologies. On-
tology and epistemology, logic, ethics and aesthetics, philosophy of science 
and language—all philosophical disciplines are also quite potent to provide 
models for world-scale transformative actions. If philosophy wants to return to 
the center of intellectual life, it should not only become a philosophy of syn-
thesis, but also itself form a synthesis with the most advanced technical, infor-
mational, biogenetic practices of the twenty-first century.
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